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MUST WE DISCARD OUR LAW OF NEGLIGENCE
IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES?
BRUNo H. GREENE*
The advisability of adopting a new format for the recovery of
damages in cases of personal injury caused by accidents seems to hinge
mainly on whether or not one advocates the abandonment of the
presently governing principles of tort liability in favor of what is known
as "absolute" or "strict" liability or "liability without fault." If such
a change is made, a corresponding change is also to be expected with
regard to the forum before which such recovery would be sought. An
administrative board would, in such an event, take over the courts'
functions to the same extent as under Workmen's Compensation. This
is proposed by the various plans for Automobile Accident Compensation.
This paper is therefore designed to:
1. discuss the fundamental principles and merits of "liability with-
out fault";
2. examine the desirability of its substitution for the principles of
tort liability now practised in this country, in the light of this writer's
belief in a jurisprudential distinction between the situations to which strict
liability now applies and those to which it is proposed to extend it; and
3. refer to some remedial plans which might enable us to improve
the present situation, without sacrificing our present system of tort
liability for damages caused by injuries resulting from accidents.
DAMAGES AND LIABILITY
A person has suffered an injury to his body. Even though the harm
cannot be undone, we shall agree that the victim should be compensated
in money as the only available equivalent to his corporal integrity which
cannot be restored. But while we agree that he should be compensated,
we disagree as to the pocket out of which such compensation is to come.
When faced with this problem, the average person will attempt to find
the individual whose fault caused the injury and hold him liable for the
compensation due the victim. Why will the average person react in this
manner? Because he has been brought up in a society in which the
conviction that there should be no liability without fault is still deeply
ingrained. The history of this development of the fault principle has
been traced by many prominent writers' and has fairly recently been
summarized by Lord Macmillan in the House of Lords in these words:
• . . [T]he process of evolution has been from the principle
that every man acts at his peril and is liable for all the con-
sequences of his acts to the principle that a man's freedom of
action is subject only to the obligation not to infringe any duty
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of care which he owes to others. The emphasis formerly was
on the injury sustained and the question was whether the case
fell within one of the accepted classes of common law actions;
the emphasis now is on the conduct of the person whose act has
occasioned the injury and the question is whether it can be
characterized as negligent.2
It has also frequently been pointed out that "fault" in negligence cases
"never has become quite synonymous with moral 'blame"3 and that the
"standard applied by the law to determine whether a man has been
negligent has always been in large part an external, objective, standard.
Where there is a duty to use care, one must act as the reasonably prudent-
man would under all the circumstances."4
However, it must be conceded that an entirely different approach
might be taken toward the solution of our problem. It might be said:
This injury of a person is damage done not only to the individual as
such, but to him as a member of society. Society, particularly in its
present complex and mostly mechanized stage, has made this injury
possible. If, for example, our victim was injured by an automobile, this
is the consequence of society's permission to its members to put auto-
mobiles on the roads and fault, if any, "is one chargeable to a society
which 'negligently' tolerates dangerous locomotion."' But, regardless of
whether or not society "is to blame," since the basic function of tort
law is to prevent accidents and to compensate victims of accidents that
do happen,6 the question as to who is at fault becomes immaterial. It is
maintained that, since, "even with successful safety campaigns there
will always be a basic residuum of destruction . . . it seems clear that the
consequences of this destruction should be borne by society at large, rather
than by the individual. ' This theory has also been advocated by foreign,
particularly French, scholars and has been characterized as a theory of
"collective responsibility."' In addition, it is pointed out that society is
not interested in a mere shifting of losses from A, the injured, to B,
the injurer. "If the only question is whether B shall be made to pay for
1 See e.g. PROSSER, TORrS, 15, 315-49 (2d ed. 1955) (cited PROSSER hereafter) ;
HOLMES: THE COMMON LAW, 144-63 (1881) ; SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS, 11-12 (7th
ed. 1924); Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability, 30 HARv. L. REv. 241, 319, 409
(1917) ; Harris, Liability Without Fault, 6 TUL. L. REV. 337 (1932).
2 Read v. J. Lyons & Co., [1947] A.C. 156, 171 (1946).
3 PROSSER, 316. See also 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, §12.1 (1956).
4 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 3.
5 EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VicTIM 3 (1954).
6 James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L.J. 549, 569 (1948).
7 James and Thornton, Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 431, 443 (1950).
8Takayanagi, Liability Without Fault in The Modern Civil and Common
Law-Il', 17 ILL. L. REV. 416, 427 (1923), citing writings by Demogue, Tridanfil
and Duguit as representative of this theory.
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this loss, any good that may come to society from having compensation
made to one of its members is exactly offset by the harm caused by taking
that amount away from another of its members." 9 On the other hand,
society is interested in the widest possible distribution of the losses suffered
by it among all of its members, so that each will pay only a bearable
portion of the common loss. How should then this loss be distributed?
It is submitted that, if this philosophy of loss distribution is accepted, the
only logical step toward its implementation is the imposition of taxes10
or of compulsory contribution by all taxable members of society to an
insurance fund." This writer does not advocate the adoption of such a
plan, because he feels that a further increase of the tax burden to cover
the costs of all deaths and injuries caused by accidents (regardless of
fault), which in 1956 amounted to "at least $11,200,000,000, ' 2
would be unwarranted. Moreover, he believes in the ability of the
members of society to weigh the risks to which they are exposing them-
selves in their everyday lives and prefers to leave it to them to cover
those risks by voluntary insurance, which, as Holmes remarked, "if de-
sired, can be better and more cheaply accomplished by private enter-
prise."'" The insurance fund mentioned above would still be a fund
designed to cover society's "liability." To such an insurance this writer
raises objections similar to those formulated by Professor Ehrenzweig
and which he expected might be raised to his own theory: "Why should
the airplane passenger be able to recover from the operator of his plane
because the latter should have taken out [liability] insurance, although
the plaintiff himself, before boarding the plane, could very well have
been expected to protect himself by [life and accident] insurance?""
Finally, if we cast the principles of tort liability overboard and adopt
social insurance in their place, we shall have Great Britain's social in-
surance which provides "a comprehensive system of minimum grants,
insuring everybody, regardless of personal and financial status, against the
major vicissitudes of modern life, and providing a bare minimum sub-
sistence, but no more"' 5 minus Great Britain's recovery under those same
tort principles of negligence law which even she refused to scrap.'
6
9 James, supra note 6, at 549.
10 See James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alterna-
tiqe Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.L. REV. 537 (1952).
11 Oliver Wendell Holmes indicated this by saying: "The state might con-
ceivably make itself a mutual insurance company against accidents, and distribute
the burden of its citizens' mishaps among all its members." THE COMMON LAW,
96 (1881).
12 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNcIL, ACCIDENT FACTS, p. 4 (1957).
13 HOLMES, THE CoMMON LAW, 96 (1881).
14 Ehrenzweig, Assurance Oblige, A Comparative Study, 15 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 445, 451 (1950).
15Friedmann, Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability, 63
HARv. L. REv. 241, 242 (1949).
16 "This possibility was thoughtfully explored in England, and rejected,
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Nevertheless, the theory of distribution of losses among all members
of society by way of taxation has the merit of consistency. It is the logical
and only implementation of the idea of "collective responsibility."' 7 On
the other hand, any theory which rejects such method of implementation,
while advocating the basic concept of distribution, and attempts to ac-
complish such distribution by establishing "group" or "enterprise" instead
of collective responsibility, seems to this writer a half-measure theory,
deserving such label certainly no less than the various exceptions tending
toward strict liability which have been ingrafted upon the fault principle
of tort law.
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
A number of eminent writers, among them Professor Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, Dean Robert A. Leflar, Professors John V. Thornton,
Harold F. McNiece and Fleming James, Jr., to name only a few, assert
that "The law of negligence as it exists today is obsolete,"' 8 that the
"negligence rule, though phrased in terms of fault, has, with regard to
tort liabilities for dangerous enterprise, come to exercise a function of
loss distribution previously developed mainly within the rules of strict.
liability" and that this "new function of 'fault' liability has transformed
its central concepts of reprehensible conduct and 'foreseeability' of harm
in a way foreign to its language and original rationale and has thus
produced in our present 'negligence' language a series of misleading
equivocations." 9 It is pointed out that our concepts of liability for fault
have been riddled by exceptions through which strict liability has been
imposed and that, even where language of "fault" is used, "Courts and
juries have been increasingly willing to find legal fault with less and
less moral blameworthiness on the part of the actor.""0 It is therefore
suggested that we should discard the "horse and buggy rules in an age of
machinery" 2' and adopt the principle that "each enterprise should pay
its own way," 2 i.e. -be liable for the harm it causes regardless of fault.
It is reasoned that society allows the "entrepreneur" to pursue his poten-
tially dangerous activity because it is socially desirable, but, in return, the
entrepreneur must assume the risk of such an enterprise, especially since
he is in a better position to insure himself against such risks, i.e. he is the
better "risk bearer." Thus, distribution over the widest area, i.e. among
all members of society, is rejected as contrary to the "social policy"
underlying a free enterprise system and, being indirect subsidization of
largely because of unwillingness to deprive injured people of the chance of the
much greater recovery at common law." James, supra note 10, at 542.
17 Takayanagi, supra note 8.
1 McNiece and Thornton, Is The Law of Negligence Obsolete.', B6 ST. JOHNS
L. REv. 255, 276 (1952).
1 EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT, 86-87 (1951).
20 James, supra note 10, at 546.
21 James, supra note 6.
22 Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 564, 584 (1952).
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an enterprise at the expense of society generally, it is considered "as much
a violation of this social policy as is direct subsidization out of the public
treasury."23
However, Professor Ehrenzweig, for example, recognizes, of
course, that a rule of "unrestricted liability for all causation . . . would
not only -be impracticable, but could be rationalized only by the paradoxi-
cal argument that the innocent injured is 'still more innocent than the
innocent injurer' . . .," and he expresses his belief that fear of such a
rule may have been the reason why the "struggle between an injurer's
and an injured's law of tort has, up to the present time, been fought
within a law of fault liability." 5 He therefore advocates the adoption
of liability for "negligence without fault" for harm "typically caused by
lawful conduct."26 This then means that liability regardless of fault
should be imposed whenever what Professor Ehrenzweig calls the
"tpicality test" is met. He explains the application of the test in an ex-
ample of the keeper of a wild animal whose liability would, under the
test, extend to that " 'general type of harm' the causation of which was
foreseeable and avoidable .yvhen he started his hazardous activity."2
Thus, while the activity is lawful, liability for the "typical harm" would
be imposed as "one of the necessary burdens and expenses incident to
such activities." 28
In analyzing this theory the first difficulty encountered is doubt as
to what constitutes an "enterprise." Is it any activity which involves the
risk of harm to others? If so, then everyone pursuing such activity acts
"at his peril." Obviously, Professor Ehrenzweig does not mean that.
"Such a proposition is merely ridiculous. Life would not be worth living
on such terms. Life never has been lived on such terms in any age or
in any country," 29 and Professor Ehrenzweig expressly rejects the rule
of "unrestricted liability for all causation.""0  Just as Professor Wex
Malone,3 1 this writer, too, has been unable to find a definition of "enter-
prise" in Professor Ehrenzweig's book, except in his explanation of
"quasi-negligent" activity as "an activity initially negligent but legalized
because of its social value."' 32 In turn, does "initially negligent" mean
"ultrahazardous," as used by the Restatement of Torts in section 519?
Probably not, since, as the author points out, activities which are a
"matter of common usage" are excluded by section 520 of the Restate-
2 3 Ibid.
24 EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 19, at 14.
25 Id. at 13.
2 6 Id. at 14.
2 7 Id. at 50.
28 HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 351 (1933).
29 Winfield, The Myth of 4bsolute Liability, 42 L.Q. REV. 37, 38 (1926).
30 EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 19, at 14.
31 Malone, This Brave New World-A Review of "Negligence Without
Fault", 25 So. CALIF. L. REv. 14 (1951).
32 EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 19, at 66.
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ment, whereas the author apparently includes them in his term "enter-
prise." It seems, therefore, that the word "enterprise," as Professor
Ehrenzweig uses it, cannot be explained without combining it with the
"typical harm" inherent in it and which, under the theory, is a pre-
requisite of liability regardless of fault. Thus, an enterprise is, pre-
sumably, any lawful activity capable of producing a type of harm to
which the "typicality test" applies. Again reference can be made to
Professor Wex Malone's lucid criticism33 revealing the difficulties in
using this extremely complicated test. He shows that it is not clear, for
example, whether "typicality" should apply to the type of risk or also
to the way in which the harm was inflicted, that considerable doubt may
arise as to whether a harm is or is not typical, even with respect to
examples given by Professor Ehrenzweig himself. If, Professor Malone
reasons, a typical risk is one which is frequently connected with the
activity in question, then the test can be applied "simply by holding the
enterprise liable for the great bulk of the risks to which it exposes the
public, for nearly all such risks are in general typical of the operation,"
in which case we are back to unrestricted liability for all causation."
Practically speaking, would a traffic policeman be liable (regardless
of fault) if his signals are misunderstood and, as a result, somebody is
injured in a collision? Is he the entrepreneur or the city which employs
him? (We must remember, of course, that the rule of respond eat
superior would not apply under the theory.) Was tfie harm typical to
the enterprise? It probably belonged to the "general type of harm" the
causation of which was foreseeable and avoidable when he started his
hazardous activity. Should he have, therefore, insured himself against
the risk? Or should the city have done so? If, as a result of the same
misunderstanding, an automobile driver injures a pedestrian, which enter-
prise becomes liable, the driver's or the policeman's or both? Is not the
harm "typical" for both? How about the car manufacturer's enterprise?
When he embarked upon his enterprise he must have been fully aware
of the fact that the car he made, good or bad, might, when driven,
cause injury to someone. Isn't, therefore, his activity "quasi-negligent"
and the harm resulting "typical" for his enterprise? Or does his liability
end when he delivers the car to the dealer, with the dealer's enterprise
taking over liability? If so, does this mean we eliminate MacPherson v.
Buick, 3 even if the car was made negligently?
Dean Leflar's illustrations of "enterprise" do not seem to do much
more to clarify the above problems. He states: "The enterprise or activity
may have been the operation of a factory or a trucking business or a
powder magazine, it may have been the driving of two of ten million
pleasure automobiles on a Sunday . . . . it may have been anything
33 Malone, supra note 31, at 18, 19.
34 Ibid.
3--217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.RLA. 1916F 696 (1916).
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[emphasis added]. '"6 If "anything" may be an enterprise which is
pursued at the entrepreneur's peril, we are again faced with the un-
acceptable rule of "unrestricted liability for all causation."
However, even if we knew what is meant by "enterprise liability"
and by "typicality of harm," other features of this theory of liability
would be open to objection. One of the justifications of enterprise
liability has been the theory that the entrepreneur derives material or
ideal profit from the dangerous activity. The financial loss suffered be-
cause of his liability is reduced by such profit, but remains smaller than
the loss the victim would have to bear in the absence of enterprise liability
and in case of his failure to recover from the injurer under tort prin-
ciples.37 But, we may ask, is the entrepreneur the only one who derives
profit from his activity? Supposing goods are transported by the seller's
truck from the seller's warehouse to the buyer's establishment and en
route a person is injured. "Is it for the benefit of the seller or the buyer
that the seller sends his goods .to the buyer? Is it for the -benefit of an
enterpriser or of the public or of both that the railroad is operated?""
Doubt has been cast by another writer on the theory that "one who has
the -benefit of the thing, should, in exchange, have the responsibility for
the damages that it causes"3 9 in these words:
But there may be doubts on the value of this justification, when
one reflects that in our day everyone derives benefit from the
employment of such dangerous things as machines and auto-
mobiles, even those who do not possess them. If other persons
did not possess them, they would not have available in their
homes or near at hand many things which we regard as
indispensable. 4
0
The same author mentions as one example that everybody in the com-
munity has an interest in bus services and derives benefit from these
potentially dangerous vehicles. Hence, the conclusion that the entre-
preneur should alone be liable under the benefit theory does not seem
convincing.
However, it is maintained that the entrepreneur is the "better risk
bearer," because he is "probably" in a better position than the victim to
insure himself and thus spread the loss among holders of a similar type
policy, even though not over society as a whole. Two objections might
be raised to this theory. First, it is hard to accept the contention that
defendant should pay merely because he is richer than the plaintiff and
that a motorist, for example, must be made to pay simply because he
"has the deeper purse, or should have if he undertakes the car-owning
36 Leflar, supra note 22, at 578.
37 Ehrenzweig, supra note 14, at 447.
3 Takayanagi, supra note 8, at 430.
39 Esmein, Liability in French Law for Damages Caused by Motor Vehicle
Accidents, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 156, 160 (1953).
40 Id. at 164.
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enterprise [emphasis added]."' Several writers have rejected this ap-
proach. One pointed out that such a rule would penalize the "industrious,
courageous and intelligent,"4 another stated that "our sense of justice is
outraged when claimants are favored merely because they happen to be
poor and defendants are disfavored merely because they happen to be
rich." 4 The other objection is that it is by no means always true that
the defendant is the better risk bearer than the plaintiff. This has been
clearly demonstrated by Professor Morris who reaches the conclusion
that "a general rule of absolute enterprise liability or liability for hazard-
ous undertakings is bound to saddle some kind of defendants with losses
they can bear no better than the kinds of plaintiffs compensated." '44
It is also argued that the entrepreneur is in a better position to bear
the risk because he can pass the cost of liability or insurance on to the
consumer. On the other hand, it has been shown that the "economics of
this argument is . . . built on dubious assumptions and oversimplifications
. . ."45 and that the theory might apply to monopoly industries, but cer-
tainly not to many small manufacturers and enterprises operating on
marginal profit, and that a price increase made necessary by the absorp-
tion of such cost might, to an individual, mean pricing himself out of
the market.4 ' Besides, should we not remember that "the law of torts
even today affects large numbers of people who are neither employers
nor manufacturers, [and that] for them the difference between strict
and non-strict liability is still important," 47 in other words that there are
people who cannot pass the cost on to anyone?
This brings up the question of insurance premium costs for liability
regardless of fault in general. We are reminded that the abolition of
the negligence requirement has been advocated "without dealing in any
positive fashion with the mounting cost of insurance."4 8 It is quite true,
of course, that accurate studies of such costs based on a specific rule of
law are very difficult.4" However, attempts at estimating costs have been
made, at least in the field of automobile accident liability. Thus,
Mr. Charles J. Haugh, Actuary for the National Bureau of Casualty and
Surety Underwriters, calculated in 1929 that the minimum cost of com-
pulsory automobile compensation insurance (based on liability regardless
41 Leflar, supra note 22, at 581.
4 2 Lucey, Liability Without Fault and The Natural Law, 24 TENN. L. REv.
952, 955 (1957).
43 Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J.
1172, 1177 (1952).
4 4 Id. at 1179.
45 Id. at 1176.
46 Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in
Products-IAn Opposing Fiew, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938, 947 (1957).
47 Friedmann, supra note 15, at 264.
48 Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 219, 239 (1953).
40 James, supra note 6, at 552.
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of fault) in New York would be $80,351,695 a year, not considering
the effect of increased claim frequency or the cost of accidents occurring
outside of New York State. In 1930, Austin J. Lilly, General Counsel
of the Maryland Casualty Company, estimated that, taking into account
a modest cost of administration of only 20 per cent, medical, hospital
and funeral expenses and a few other factors, such as an increase in
claims due to an increased "claim-consciousness" which such plans will
inevitably evoke, the loss cost to American motorists with their 25 million
motor vehicles then registered would come to $866,160,000 per annum.
But today, with 65,500,000 registered automobiles, a higher rate of
injuries and deaths than in 1930, with higher standards to be considered,
higher costs of administration and an even greater claim-consciousness
5 0
those figures would be immeasurably increased. Professor Glenn A.
McCleary's article on the peculiar type of the "last clear chance" doctrine
in Missouri51 includes a chart" which demonstrates that Missouri auto-
mobile liability insurance rates are considerably higher than those of
other states on a comparable basis. Professor McCleary attributes this to
the increased responsibility imposed by Missouri law under its type of
humanitarian doctrine. Recently, an insurance expert expressed his view
on this point and concluded that, if damages in automobile accidents
were to be paid regardless of fault, the cost of such insurance would be
"well-nigh prohibitive" and would "sharply limit its sale.""3 It can
hardly be doubted that, if liability without fault were adopted for all
recoveries in personal injury cases caused by accident, the cost would be
even more prohibitive.
THE FAULT PRINCIPLE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
From what has been said above this writer draws the conclusion
that enterprise liability does not seem the alternative to be adopted in
preference to our present system of fault liability and that it is wiser to
maintain the latter as a rule and depart from it in favor of strict liability
only in the relatively limited area in which exceptions to it are felt to be
in the interest of justice. Perhaps we have fought the "struggle between
an injurer's and an injured's law of tort"5 4 within a law of fault liability
simply because most of us still feel that, as a rule, a person should not
be held liable for something "he did not do." As one writer put it:
"The impulse to relieve the innocent is one which we cherish as a part
50LILLY, COMPULSORY AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, COMPULSORY COMPENSATION
FOR MOTOR VEHICLE INJURIES AND MOTOR VEHICLE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS,
ASSOCIATION OF CASUALTY AND SURETY EXECUTVES, p. 22 (1930, as reprinted 1932).
51 McCleary, The Bases of the Humanitarian Doctrine Reexamined, 5 Mo.
L. REV. 56 (1940).
52Id. at 87.
53 DesChamps, Coverage for Innocent Viclim Pays Off, 1956 INS. L.J. 722-23.
54 EHRENzWEIG, op. cit. supra note 19, at 13.
[Vol. 19
MUST WE DISCARD NEGLIGENCE?
of our emotional adulthood, and we are not likely to surrender it
easily. ' ' 5
As indicated above, 6 the concept of "fault" never was synonymous
with "moral blame" and whatever moral censure there was has been
further diluted in the law of negligence, so that today it has practically
nothing to do with morally reprehensible conduct. It means only that
we had to establish a line, more or less arbitrary and certainly highly
flexible according to existing circumstances, which we called the "con-
duct of the reasonably prudent man." One who fell below that line
became liable, even though we recognized that anyone of us might drop
below it at any time, simply because we are human beings and hence
fallible. In this fashion "the defendant's fault provides the law with a
basis for compensating the plaintiff""7 for defendant's harm-causing
conduct which, in the court's opinion, could have been avoided if the
standard of care of the reasonable man had 'been observed. On the other
hand, if such standard was in fact observed, then recovery is, generally
speaking, denied.
However, just as many other rules, this rule, too, had to be modified
by exceptions as time went on, particularly with the development of our
mechanized age. The conduct of human affairs became more and more
extensive and less and less personal. There is no denying that ours is a
far cry from the "horse and buggy" age. But there are certain immu-
tables which do not, or should not, change along with the change of times.
The sense of human justice is one of them. True, with the change of
concepts, the law, too, had to be adjusted to the new concepts. However,
that cannot mean -that we ought to adopt a new system which is entirely
foreign to our basic thinking, such as the imposition of liability regard-
less of fault on one group of society merely because of one type of activity
which that particular group pursues, while the rest of society lives under
entirely different rules."8 The imposition of different rules can be justi-
fied only if the manner in which that activity is pursued is different from
the manner in which the individual member of society as a whole is
expected to conduct his business. That is why section 520 of the Restate-
ment of Torts restricts the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher9 in its original
form and excludes ' common usage" from the application of its "ultra-
hazardous activity" standard, since, if a large segment of society is
engaged in such an activity, the hazard involved becomes one of the
hazards of daily living common to all, making the imposition of a
55 Malone, supra note 31, at 16.
56 Supra note 3.
57Jaffe, supra note 48, at 221.
5s "It is dubious social policy to single out a particular group in society and
make its members or some of its members bear the cost of what may be a very
commendable reform, while everyone else in society operates under an entirely
different legal doctrine and philosophy." Plant, supra note 46, at 948.
-9 186S L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
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special type of liability upon a particular actor unnecessary and unjust.60
Thus imposition of strict liability appears in various forms as an
exception to the fault principle. Among the persons on whom such strict
liability has -been imposed by statute or by the courts are, for example,
the keepers of animals which stray onto the land of others or of wild
animals, persons who engage in an activity which is highly dangerous to
others and, at the same time, abnormal in the community, such as the
storing of explosives in thickly settled communities, blasting and nui-
sances, such as smoke, dust, bad odors, noxious gases and the like from
industrial enterprises, all obviously related to the cases following Rylands
v. Fletcher" and, of course, the employer under Workmen's Compensa-
tion.
It would seem that these heterogenous types of strict liability are
not based on one comprehensive theory, but are justified by the high de-
gree of harm the activities involved are likely to produce and the gen-
erally unusual circumstances under which they take place. However, it
is submitted that a common denominator might be found which may
explain their rationale. This is not to say that the courts and legislatures
have consciously adopted the reasoning discussed -below. Yet, such rea-
soning may have led to the establishment of strict liability in such in-
stances as those used as examples above.
THE ELEMENT OF CONTROL
The influence of the element of control upon strict liability might
be explained in the following fashion: Society says to the individual:
"You are the master of your activities. You are expected to be in control
of those activities. As long as you are 'at the controls' we shall expect
you to act with the care of any reasonably prudent man under the cir-
cumstances, so as to avoid harm to others. If you exercise such care,
you will not be held liable. However, if, for certain reasons, control of
the acticity which you set in motion is not in your own hands, we shall be
unable to apply such a standard of care to you, because there can be no
standard of care in the absence of control. Hence, we shall hold you
liable regardless of your fault." What are the circumstances under which
such control is absent?
1. Where control cannot be exercised
a) because of the nature of the instrumentality itself (wild
60"The reason would appear to be that if the activity is one carried on by
a large proportion of persons in the community, the incidence of harm and the in-
cidence of responsibility are so nearly coextensive that nothing would be gained
by imposing strict liability. Unless there is a special danger created by a small
segment at the expense of the general public, absolute liability would merely sub-
stitute a risk of liability for a risk of loss. This interpretation of the common
usage test is borne out by the ordinary refusal to apply absolute liability in cases
of accidents involving automobiles or household plumbing." Note, 61 HARv. L. REv.
515, 520 (1948).1 61 PROSSER, 337.
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animal, dynamite, etc.) or
b) 'because of the complexity of the activity involved which
makes internal control of the various stages of which it is
made up impossible (industrial enterprises subject to Work-
men's Compensation).
2. Where control has been delegated to others.
It should be pointed out that "control" as used in the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur has acquired a connotation different from the one used
here. The doctrine becomes inoperative when control ends, which means
that the inference of defendant's liability disappears. This, in turn,
means that, under those circumstances, he is not expected to be "at the
controls" any more, since someone else has taken over entirely or
partially. On the other hand, the word as used in this discussion implies
that the defendant should be in control but is not and, as a result, is
saddled with liability regardless of fault. Dean Prosser has pointed out
the inadequacy of the use of the word "control" in connection with the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and suggests that it should be replaced by
saying merely "that the apparent cause of the accident must be such
that the defendant would be responsible for any negligence connected
with it." 2
It seems that impossibility of control is the real basis of the definition
of an ultrahazardous activity used by the Restatement of Torts: "An
activity may be ultrahazardous because of the instrumentality which is
used in carrying it on, the nature of the subject matter with which it
deals or the condition which it creates."0" In rejecting the rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher, Judge Williams said: "Even if the rule stated were
a just one . . . it should be applied with careful discrimination to things
which, like grass, spread slowly and are subject to more or less control." 4
It should be kept in mind, of course, that sometimes circumstances
will determine whether or not control can be exercised in such manner
as to prevent harm. Thus it will become important, for example, in what
location blasting operations are conducted, i.e., whether in populated areas
or in remote places," just as the question as to whether control can be
exercised over an animal will depend on the locality in which the animal
is to be controlled. Thus Prosser reminds us that in Burma an elephant
is regarded as a safe, domesticated animal.66
Again, in the case of industrial workers protected by Workmen's
Compensation, absence of direct control is the striking element. "Prior
to 1900 the owner of a plant usually operated it, was regularly in the
6 2 Id. at 206.
6 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §520(b), comment b (1938).
64 Gulf, C. & S.F.R. Co. v. Oakes, 94 Tex. 155, 58 S.W. 999, 52 L.R.A. 293
(1900).
G7 See PROSSER, 336, n. 74, citing, among others, Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal. App.
2d 778, 214 P.2d 50 (1950).
6 PROSSER, 323, n. 87.
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plant, and generally felt a sense of responsibility toward his employees.
The 'trust' movement introduced the absentee owner, with resulting de-
cline in sense of responsibility. Processses were speeded up, greater energy
was used to operate heavier machines, and operations became steadily
more dangerous.""7 We witness a "vast aggregation of machinery which
the individual workman can neither comprehend nor control [emphasis
added].""8 Obviously, neither can the employer, absentee or resident.
Finally, we reach strict liability where one person has authorized
another to act for him, thus delegating direct control of the activity to
the other. Liability -then is imposed under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. While it is quite true that the reason for such liability can be
found simply in policy considerations, the justification of such policy
seems more convincing when viewed within the frame of the theory
here developed. Thus he who should pursue his own activity with the
care of a reasonable man has chosen to have someone else do it for him.
He is liable for the failure of his delegate to live up to the standard of
care, not because he exercises a fictitious control over the delegate (which
may be an adequate criterion to qualify the delegate as a "servant"),
but because he has made it impossible to apply the standard to himself,
although it is his activity which his delegate is pursuing. The widest
application of this principle is, of course, found in the master's liability
for the torts of -his servant committed while acting in the course of his
employment69 and extended to agents other than servants 70 and, in some
instances, to independent contractors, a delevolpment foreseen by Professor
Seavey in 1934.71 Extension of liability for torts of independent con-
tractors is based on various theories, such as negligence in selecting him,
or inherently dangerous activities with which the contractor is entrusted,
etc. However, the doctrine of non-delegable duty seems the most con-
vincing argument in favor of imposing liability upon the contractee.
72
In some other instance, in which vicarious liability is imposed, the
67 SOMERS AND SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 8 (1954).
68 DOWNEY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 6-8 (1924).
6 9 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §219 (1933).
70 PROSSER, 356.
71 Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior", HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS,
433, 456 (1934). Professor Morris advocates liability of the contractee by saying:
". ... while it is usually desirable that a contractor be ultimately liable for his
torts, in general, the contractee should be responsible to' third persons," Morris,
The Torts of An Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REv. 339, 345 (1934).
72 The difficulties in establishing when a duty is non-delegable have been
pointed out by many writers. For extensive discussions of this and other problems
of liability for torts of independent contractors see especially Morris, supra note
71, Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. Cm. L. REV. 501
(1935) and Jolowicz, Liability For Independent Contractors in the English Com-
mon Lau-.A Suggestion, 9 STAN. L. REV. 690 (1957). The last named writer
suggests two criteria for finding a duty non-delegable: 1. the value of the plain-
tiff's interest to which damage has been caused and 2. in some cases, the character
of the risk created by the activity.
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courts justify their holdings frequently on the ground that liability should
exist because the defendant retained control over the delegate and hence
the delegate's negligence should be imputed to defendant, particularly in
automobile negligence cases, where the owner, by his mere presence in
the car, was said to have exercised control.73 This language seems con-
fusing and the device of imputing the driver's negligence to the owner
unnecessary. It appears simpler to base the owner's liability on the
theory that, by giving up control of his car to the driver, thus entrusting
him with an activity which he himself should have been pursuing, he
became strictly liable for the driver's negligence, regardless of the fact
that he chose to be a guest in his own car. This reasoning also seems to
underly provisions like section 59 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic
Law which imposes liability on the owner of an automobile, even though
not present in the car, for injuries to third persons caused by the negli-
gence of anyone who operates the car on a public highway with the
owner's consent. Likewise, the "family purpose doctrine," under which
liability is imposed on the owner of an automobile who permits members
of his household to drive it for their own convenience, may be explained
in the light of the above control theory.
LIABILITY FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
While the adoption of "enterprise liability" has been advocated in
all areas of damages for personal injuries resulting from accidents, these
efforts have been particularly persistent in the field of automobile accident
liability. Various compensation plans have been proposed, the merits of
which this writer has discussed elsewhere.74 In essence, they are all
based on "liability without fault" and patterned after the so-called
Columbia Plan,7" with the benefits scheduled along the lines of Work-
men's Compensation and the administration entrusted to a compensation
board, deriving the funds necessary for compensation from insurance
premiums paid on a compulsory basis by all motorists. Most of the plans
are "exclusive," which means that the injured person loses his right of
recovery in tort against the injurer. No compensation is paid for pain
and suffering. For business and professional men, profits take the place
of wages in the calculation of awards. For certain groups of non-wage
earners minimum wages are "assumed." These plans, although fre-
quently proposed, have to date been rejected in all jurisdictions, except
in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan, where a somewhat modified
version of a compensation plan is in operation.
When we apply the control theory developed above to automobile
73 See e.g. Goochee v. Wagner, 257 N.Y. 344, 178 N.E. 553 (1931).
74 See Ryan and Greene, Pedestrianism: A Strange Philosophy, 42 A.B.A.J.
117, 183 (1956).
75REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE
AccIDENTS TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (1932).
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cases, it becomes obvious that none of the conditions for strict liability
established under it apply to the liability of the operator of a motor
vehicle. Control over the ordinary vehicle is by no means impossible,
either by the nature of the instrumentality or by the complexity of the
activity. As long as the responsible driver is at the controls, we can
apply the standard of the reasonable man to him and hold him liable
for falling below it. The driving of an automobile is a matter of
common usage.
This together with the fact that the risk involved in the care-
ful operation of a carefully maintained automobile is slight,
is sufficient to prevent their operation from being an ultra-
hazardous activity. However, the use of an automotive vehicle
of such size and weight as to be incapable of safe control and
to be likely to crush water and gas mains . . . is not as yet a
usual means of transportation and, therefore, the use of such
an automobile is ultrahazardous [emphasis added]."M
Nevertheless, one of the most vigorously asserted arguments for all
compensation plans is the similarity of their rationale to the principles of
Workmen's Compensation. That the situations are not analogous has
been demonstrated previously77 on the ground that the accident com-
pensable under Workmen's Compensation arises out of employment,
that the insurance cost can be passed on to the consumer, that the loss
can be weighed against accident preventing measures and thus induce the
introduction of such measures, that there is privity of contract between
employer and employee, absent in automobile accident cases, that there
is comparative equality of awards under Workmen's Compensation,
based on generally similar wage scales, which, of course, does not apply
in automobile cases, etc. A recent study prepared by the New York
Temporary Commission on the Courts points, moreover, to the difference
in the philosophical justification of compensating an employee regardless
of anyone's fault as compared to compensating a stranger if injured
through his own negligence, to the absence of a real yardstick for
measuring compensation of children, housewives and students, and to
the willingness of an employer to satisfy his employee by payment of a
contestable claim, in order to promote "good will," which would be
totally absent in automobile cases.7 8
76 Carter, J. in Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 498, 499, 190 P.2d 1,
7 (1948).
77 Ryan and Greene, sukra note 74.
78THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE COURTS, IN RE A COMPENSATION
PLAN FOR AUTOMOBILE NEGLIGENCE CASES, 65, 68 (August 1956). This has also
been stressed recently in these words: "Even if the analogy between industrial
and vehicular accidents is a true one, certain basic objections to such a plan still
remain. In the first place, while a schedule of benefit payments could be satis-
factorily worked out for wage-earners, a real problem would exist in creating a
suitable schedule for those victims who were self-employed or in the executive
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But if we assume that there is sufficient analogy in these two situ-
ations, it would seem advisable, before adapting the principles of
Workmen's Compensation to a new field of application, to examine
whether the system of Workmen's Compensation, as practised at the
present time, offers sufficient inducements to such a wholesale adoption.
Only a few questions can-be raised within the framework of this article
to illustrate the difficulties encountered in the present administration of
Workmen's Compensation, which would be multiplied if such a plan
were extended to automobile accidents.
It has been said that under Workmen's Compensation "the pay-
ments for maiming are much, much less than in a negligence action."
79
In support of this statement the author of the cited article reminds us
that in iffolder v. New York C. & St. L.R.R. s ° the plaintiff was
awarded $80,000 in a court action for the loss of one leg, while under
the New York compensation statute, which is one of the most liberal
ones, he would have received $17,280, in Indiana, where the injury
occurred, $11,000 and in Vermont $4,250. A recent study by the
Institute of Judicial Administration tells us: "The fundamental concept
of Workmen's Compensation is speedy, simple and inexpensive justice.
. . . However, complex procedures have developed and over 100,000
litigated cases arise in this field each year.""- This is also reflected in
Justice Murphy's statement that certain Workmen's Compensation terms
are "deceptively simple and litigiously prolific." 2  Thus Workmen's
Compensation has come under heavy attack recently, mainly because of
the inadequacy of its benefits, the high administrative expense and the
excessive litigation of the compensation system.8 3 As to the last men-
tioned criticism, it has been said that the amount of litigation in Work-
men's Compensation represents "a great great gap between theory and
practice."8 4 Is there any reason to assume that these disadvantages will
be lessened rather than increased in automobile accident compensation?
The above cited study by the Institute of Judicial Administration also
reaches the conclusion that "neither Workmen's Compensation, nor a
similar agency for automobile tort cases will eliminate the need for
class. Any suggestion that this problem can be remedied by leaving the victim a
tort remedy over and above the compensation remedy [Grad, Recent Develop-
ments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLUMa. L. REv, 300, 329 (1950)]
would be no solution at all, for it would only serve to superimpose an administra-
tive process upon an already overly congested court system." Note, 32 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 147, 155, r. 44 (1957).
79 Jaffe, supra note 48, at 236.
80339 U.S. 96 (1950).
81 INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS FOR
AUTOMOBILE TORT CASES--WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMPARED (DELAY AND
CONGESTION-SUGGESTED REMEDIES SERIES No. 8) (May 15, 1956) p. 16.
82 Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 330 U.S. 469, 479 (1947).
83 KULP, CASUALTY INSURANCE 134 (3d ed. 1956).
84 j. RE, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, Bull. 172, p. 157.
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representation by counsel, despite the intentions of the drafters of the
statute,"8 5 and that "the expert testimony problems faced by parties in
automobile tort litigation have not been solved by the majority of
Workmen's Compensation agencies."8 6 How far from offering a whole-
sale solution the adoption of compensation schedules is, is illustrated by
the statement that, as far as litigation over the degree of disability is
concerned, which "the fathers of compensation laws thought they had
settled by benefit formulas and schedules," such formulas cannot deter-
mine these medico-legal questions.8 7 Not only do the Workmen's Com-
pensation laws fail to avoid litigation, -but, under some interpretations of
their provisions, the employer becomes liable for amounts beyond the
established schedules. Thus, he may be strictly liable for the scheduled
benefits in case of direct action by the employee, but remain liable in
tort beyond such benefits if the action is brought by a third party, a
result contrary to the basic idea of "exclusiveness" of the remedy against
hin under the Workmen's Compensation laws. This situation was
presented in Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small
Estates,"s where defendant's employees negligently -broke a gas pipe
maintained by the plaintiff in a public highway, as the result of which
gas escaped and killed one of defendant's employees in the course of his
employment. In an action by decedent's administratrix judgment was
recovered against the plaintiff who now brought action against defendant
for reimbursement of the sums he had to pay in the previous action,
including costs. Defendant's contention that he, having taken out in-
surance under Workmen's Compensation, was liable only for the sched-
uled benefits, was held not to constitute a good defense. Thus, because
the money passed through the hands of a third party, the employer be-
came liable beyond the compensation schedule. This case has been
followed consistently by a long line of subsequent cases. Translated into
automobile compensation, the following would result: Assume that auto-
mobile drivers A and B collide on a grade crossing. A is severely injured
and brings an action against the railroad, alleging the latter's negligence
in maintaining the crossing. A recovers a substantial sum against the
railroad which considerably exceeds what he could have recovered under
automobile compensation schedules (regardless of fault). The railroad,
having paid A, now brings an action against B, claiming that it was B's
negligence which caused the accident and the loss of money to the rail-
road. Under the Westchester case the fact that B was insured under
automobile accident compensation, hence only liable under compensation
schedules, would be no bar to plaintiff's recovery, since, as in the West-
chester case, the action is not brought under subrogation, but is based on
5 INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 81, at 17.
86 Id. at 19.
87 SOMERS AND SOMIERS, supra note 67, at 183.
278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
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an independent cause of action. Thus, insurance under the compensa-
tion plan would not protect B and he would still be liable under the
common law principle of negligence. In a number of cases, then, the
victim would still resort to the common law, in order to get a higher
award, even though he would have to do it by way of a third party
action, and thus obtain indirectly what he could not get directly. The
results as to court congestion would be similar as in the case of adoption
of "non-exclusive" compensation systems.
8 9
This writer pointed out elsewhere9 ° that the adoption of a compen-
sation board for automobile accidents would entail the establishment of
a very sizeable apparatus, with a full complement of law-trained per-
sonnel, adjusters, etc. to handle the expected large number of claims
and determine such issues as causal relationship, character and extent of
injuries, etc. It must also be remembered that virtually every accident
would result in a claim before the compensation board and would have
to be processed by it, whereas at the present time a majority of claims is
settled -before ever reaching the courts. But the most important objection
to the determination of these claims by an administrative board lies in
the person on whose judgment the award depends. Insistence on judicial
review of administrative adjudications in this country is prompted by the
greater confidence we place in our judges as compared to administrative
functionaries. We have, therefore, contrary to the -British system, re-
tained the principle of judicial review in Workmen's Compensation cases.
Thus Dean Arthur Larson concluded in a recent article 9 1 that the
British Commissioner of Insurance and his administrators, even though
lawyers, are far more inclined to be bound by the letter of the statute
or regulation they administer than a judge whose easy familiarity with
the law and its administration enables him to cut through its wording
and reach its intent and policy. It is to be expected that determination
in the usually far more serious automobile accident cases will require an
even greater skill and experience from the awarding body which, there-
fore, should not be left without judicial supervision, even at the initial
stage of proceedings. If, then, we are to allow judicial review of de-
cisions made by the administrative board, as we obviously must, and let
the plaintiff sue on principles of tort liability in the courts, either when-
ever he alleges any negligence, as under the Saskatchewan plan, or
criminal negligence or willful or wanton acts, as suggested in some plans,
89 See Note, supra note 78. See also ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, MOTOR
VEHICLE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION, PUBLICATION 128 at page 33 (Nov. 1956), which
concludes: "Moreover, unless adoption of such a plan of compensation were
accompanied by substantially complete elimination of rights to sue under tradi-
tional negligence concepts, there would still be very substantial burdens on the
courts and also a large volume of post-accident investigation and compromise
such as now exists."
90 Ryan and Greene, supra note 74, at 121.
91 Larson, The Myth of ldministrative Generosity: 4 Lesson From British
Experience, 40 A.B.A.J. 195, 262 (1954).
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we shall only add an overcongested administrative tribunal to over-
congested courts.
As pointed out above, it is extremely difficult to estimate the cost
of a compensation plan for physical injuries in general and those resulting
from automobile accidents in particular. But, in. addition to a reference
to the estimates noted before, 2 let us consider merely a few figures from
recent sources. In the 1956 study prepared for the New York Tempo-
rary Commission on the Courts it was estimated that, not counting ex-
penses connected with the physical apparatus required, such as buildings,
personnel, etc., and on the basis of only a 40 per cent cost of administra-
tion, Automobile Accident Compensation would, in the State of New
York alone, cost $277,735,900 a year, with benefits computed on the
basis of Workmen's Compensation schedules." Of this amount approxi-
mately $195,525,640 would be available for actual compensation. How-
ever, operating expenses of Workmen's Compensation are much nearer
to 48 per cent of all costs and have even been estimated in some states
at 56.5 per cent.94 The insurer's administrative expenses, measured by
Workmen's Compensation experience, would certainly be no lower in an
automobile compensation scheme than they are for automobile liability.9"
"The hopes of compensation supporters of sharp decreases are based
principally on expectations of greatly reduced litigation, which in view
of the recent attack on workmen's compensation . . . seem unduly
optimistic." 9 But, even if such expense were actually incurred, would
this assure an adequate compensation of the victim to which he is en-
titled under our present system? Doubts in this respect are not allayed
when we realize that the estimated cost of wage losses and medical ex-
penses.resulting from work injuries amounted in 1955 to $1,370,000,000,
for which compensation paid amounted to only $920,000,000Y7  The
same costs of automobile accident injuries in the same year were esti-
mated at $1,470,000,000." 8 A compensation in the same proportions as
indicated above for work accidents would hardly be considered fair and
adequate.
The automobile accident compensation system in effect in Saskat-
chewan, Canada, is the only compensation plan adopted in the Americas. 9
9 2 LILLY, Op. cit. supra note 50; McCleary, supra note 50; DesChamps, supra
note 53.
93 THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE COURTS, supra note 78 at 122.
94 SOMERS AND SOMERS, op. cit. supra note 67, at 194, 195.
95 KULP, Op. cit. supra note 83, at 225.
96 Ibid.
97 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS (1956) and ACCIDENT FACTS
(1957), p. 13, 39.
98 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS (1956) p. 13.
99 For details of the plan see especially Marx, Compensation Insurance for
Automobile Accident Victims: The Case for Compulsory Automobile Compensation
Insurance, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 134, 141 (1954) and Marx, "Motorism", Not "Pedestri-
anism": Compensation for the Automobile's Victims, 42 A.B.A.J. 421, 425 (1956).
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The plan is of the "non-exclusive" type, i.e., it reserves to the injured
party, in addition to his right to compensation, the right of action in tort,
if he alleges negligence on the part of the injurer, but the amount of the
compensation award must be credited on the judgment. The plan "is
part of a much larger program of nationalization which includes a half
dozen basic industries."' 0 ° The same act which created the compensation
scheme also established a monopolistic state insurance fund administered
by the Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office, to which every driver
in the province must contribute. Premiums are extremely low. The main
reasons for this fact have been found to be low inherent hazards, low
administrative expense and low benefits as well as the circumstance that
a compulsory hospitalization insurance system pays all expenses of hospi-
talization resulting from automobile accidents.' The province is a thinly
settled plain with a population density one twentieth that of Wisconsin.
During most of the winter 60 per cent of Easkatchewan cars are totally
immobilized because of impassable roads. The extent of the benefits is
illustrated by such rates as $4,000 for the loss of both hands, both feet or
both eyes, $2,700 for the loss of one arm or one leg, $2,000 for the loss
of one hand or one foot or one eye, etc. For medical services "supple-
mental grants" up to an aggregate of $600 are given.' In 1949 an
average payment of $166 per person is reported.' 3 It seems clear that
these conditions and rates are no basis for an analogy to situations existing
in the United States.' 4 It has justly been said that writers who advocate
the adoption of the Saskatchewan plan in the United States overlook the
fact that "Americans think in comparatively extravagant terms" and
that recoveries in this country are large, because of our greater wealth
as compared to other countries.10 5 The same writer also reminds us that
the "ethical sense-or the sense of caution-becomes sowewhat dulled
in the presence of an impersonal insurance fund"' 0 6 thus enhancing the
claim-consciousness to which our people are prone. One writer reaches
the conclusion that "when and if the people of the United States decide
for automobile compensation, it will probably be for reasons quite other
than those to be drawn from the experience of the Saskatchewan
precedent."'1
0 7
Reforms of our present system are needed to assure fair, adequate
and speedy compensation to all innocent victims of injuries to person
and property caused by accidents. As has been pointed out in a previous
100 KULP, op. cit. supra note 83, at 226.
101 Id. at 227.
102 SASKATCHE.VAN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INSURANCE ACT 1947, §17, Sched-
ule A.
103 THE TEMPORARY COMIISSION ON THE COURTS, supra note 78, at 39.
104 KULP, op. cit. supra note 83, at 226.
'
05 Jaffe, supra note 48, at 238.
10 Id. at 239.
107 KULP, op. cit. supra note 83, at 227.
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article, 08 steps toward such improvements have been recommended and
have partly been actually taken. One of the measures mentioned was
the action by insurance companies in instituting special "endorsements" to
the holders of liability insurance policies, extending coverage to bodily
injuries to an insured caused by an uninsured motorist in limits of $10,000
for each person, subject to a maximum of $20,000 per accident. This
coverage extends also to guests of the insured and to the insured and
members of his family as pedestrians. Judge Marx quotes one sample of
such an endorsement of a mutual insurance company in his recent
article 0 9 which shows that the insurer agreed to pay the compensation
uithout regard to fault where the automobile causing the damage was
uninsured. Since that article was written, the mutual insurance companies
have abandoned this form of endorsement and have, beginning January
30, 1957, reverted to the type of endorsement adopted by the stock compa-
nies. The endorsement now contains the clause: ". . . provided, for the
purposes of this endorsement, determination as to whether the insured
• .. is legally entitled to recover such damages . . .shall be made by
agreement between the insured and the company or . . by arbitration."
Thus it seems that their experience with liability regardless of fault of
the insured has not commended the continuance of this system to the
insurance companies.
In its recommendations dated February 4, 1957, the New York
Temporary Commission ok1 the Courts emphatically rejected the adoption
of a compensation plan for automobile accident cases. It stated that
"automobile cases are, in fact, less than half of total Supreme Court
business and in a county like New York County only about 30 p.c.
Thus the impact of a compensation plan on the courts would not be as
great as frequently claimed. . . " The Commission bases its rejection
of all proposals for such compensation plans on the following reasons:
Increased costs to automobile owners and the public, the elimination of
fault as a basis of liability, the lack of any legal relationship between the
usual parties to accidents (as compared to Workmen's Compensation
cases), the probable inadequacy of payments provided if every injury is
to be compensated, -the substantial increase in number of claims and the
likelihood that delay would simply be transferred to the Administrative
Agency." 0 The Commission also stressed its belief that "all such con-
troversies whether caused by motor vehicles or otherwise should be dealt
with in the courts and that the machinery of the administration of
justice can be so improved as to deal adequately with all justiciable
matters.""' Fundamental remedies were suggested regarding Revision
108 Ryan and Greene, supra note 74, at 186-87.
109 Marx, supra note 99 at 424-25.
110 1957 REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE CouRTs, IV, RECOM-
MENDATIONS RESPECTING CALENDAR CONGESTION AND DELAY, LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENT
(1957) No. 6(c), 45.
I" Id. at 46.
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and Simplification of the Structure of the Courts.. and Revision and
Modernization of Practice and Procedure of the Courts."' Before
those sweeping changes can be adopted, however, calendar congestion is
being reduced by devices currently in use, such as intercourt transfer of
judges and cases," 4 the highly successful pre-trial hearings," 5 impartial
medical panels".6 and special arbitration proceedings worked out by
insurance carriers."' In addition, the Commission has recommended an
increase in the number of Supreme Court Justices,"1 the appointment of
pre-trial masters," 9 the adoption of legislation establishing the principle
of comparative negligence on an experimental basis,' 20 a greater uni-
formity in filing fees and cost provisions with the aim of deterring
attorneys from bringing actions in a higher court which should have
been brought in a lower court' 21 and some measures to force expansion
of the trial bar by limiting the number of cases any attorney can hold
pending while otherwise engaged in trial. 22
A few other recent proposals, which suggest remedies while retain-
ing our principle of tort liability, should be mentioned, without discussing
their merits within the framework of this article.
Justice Samuel Hofstadter of the New York Supreme Court sug-
gests the assignment of automobile accident cases to a special court,
composed of one jurist, one layman and one pyhsician, and the adoption
of the principle of comparative negligence. In these cases juries will be
dispensed with.' 2 ' Mr. Francis H. Patrono, a member of the Penn-
sylvania Bar, suggests to let juries decide the question of liability in
personal injury cases, but, after the jury has rendered a verdict for the
plaintiff, to refer the case to a board of specialists in forensic medicine
which would hold a hearing, at which both sides would be heard, and
whose report would then be the basis of a monetary evaluation by the
court, which would be guided by certain standards he suggests.
1 24
112 1957 REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE COURTS, I, A RECOM-
MENDATION FOR A SIMPLIFIED STATE-WIDE COURT SYSTEM (1957).
113 1957 REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE COURTS, III FIRST
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMIrEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENT (1957) No. 6(b).
114 1957 REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE COURTS, IV, supra
note 110, at 17-18.
115Id. at 18.
11Id. at 19-20.
117 Id. at 20.
's Id. at 21-24.
119 Id. at 25-38.
120 Id. at 40-41.
121 Id. at 41.
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Professors McNiece and Thornton suggested a few years ago the
retention of our "existing legal structure plus compulsory insurance, plus,
where necessary, state aid to the needy accident victim (the latter without
regard to his personal fault)." '125 The first part of this suggestion, i.e.,
compulsory insurance, has recently been adopted in New York State.
It should alleviate some of the problems presented by the uninsured
motorist, even though some gaps remain to be filled.1 26 It is too soon
to tell whether or not the plan will work out satisfactorily.
CONCLUSION
This writer believes that, for the reasons he has tried to develop, it
would be inadvisable to discard the tort principles of the American law
relating to recovery of damages for personal injuries in favor of com-
pensation plans based on the principle of liability regardless of fault.
Everyone agrees that the "first line of defense" against injuries is their
prevention. In this respect some excellent suggestions have been made in
the direction of proper controls relating to the physical condition of the
driver, the increased safety of the vehicle and the stricter enforcement
of traffic laws. 127 On the other hand, this writer feels that our present
system, when improved along lines similar to those proposed by the
New York Temporary Commission on the Courts, will be perfectly
adequate to provide for both fair and speedy compensation of victims of
accidents which have not been avoided.
125 McNiece and Thornton, Is the Law of Negligence Obsolete?, 26 ST. JOHNS
L. REv. 255, 273 (1952).
126 Note, supra note 78, at 162-65.
127 McNiece and Thornton, Automobile Accident Prevention and Compensa-
tion, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv., 585, 591-97.
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